There will be a ceasefire, but it brings new risks: Yaroslav Hrytsak discusses Trump's victory, Putin's mistakes, and Zaluzhny's future.

As Ukraine approaches the third anniversary of the full-scale war, the outlook remains highly uncertain: forecasts of an unfavorable ceasefire are becoming more frequent, the situation in the Kursk direction, which has inspired Ukrainians, is complicated, and societal tension is rising due to mobilization and corruption scandals. All this is occurring against the backdrop of advancing occupiers on the front lines and the impending harsh winter. Adding fuel to the fire is another unknown factor – Donald Trump's future policy towards Ukraine and Russia.

What prospects await Ukraine in the coming months? What social contract should Ukrainians establish among themselves? What should replace the heroic narrative, and what can we expect from the unpredictable Trump? These questions were discussed by "Telegraph" with historian, publicist, and professor at the Ukrainian Catholic University Yaroslav Hrytsak.

"Chaos adds to uncertainty"

– Yaroslav, top news: Donald Trump is the next president of the United States . What are your emotions? What should we all expect?

– This victory is unexpected for me because I didn’t anticipate anything from these elections, as they were as unclear as the situation on the front in Ukraine. If we had uncertainty before, now this uncertainty is compounded by chaos. Whether this chaos will benefit Ukraine or not is hard for me to say, as all options are possible. However, I understand that the situation will change. It will change radically. But I cannot say how exactly. I do not believe that Trump can force Putin to sit at the negotiating table. And even if he does get him to the table, does he have enough leverage to pressure Putin into reaching a certain compromise?

– Recently, KMIS released the results of a sociological study. For the first time since the beginning of the large-scale invasion, sociologists recorded a decrease in the number of people willing to endure the war for a long time. It has always been 71-73%, now it’s 63%. It seems like not a significant difference, but still. Most experts, including you, argue that the war will be prolonged. This is obviously the case. Do you see a contradiction in this? The war is long, yet fewer people are willing to endure it.

– If this is the case, then the war will end sooner than we thought, but it will end with the capitulation or collapse of Ukraine. I understand that for some people, a bad, humiliating peace is better than a "beautiful" war. But we understand that this is not a conventional war like, say, the Finnish-Soviet War. This war is more akin to World War II, where there can only be one winner. This winner wants to erase the defeated country from the map of the world. Ukrainians want Russia to change and collapse, while Russia wants to erase Ukraine from the world map. The stakes are very high. Is a ceasefire possible with such stakes? Perhaps. But not peace, only a ceasefire.

When we talk about a long war, I believe it will only end when Russia can no longer or does not want to continue fighting. I cannot say when that time will come, but I do not think it will come quickly.

I am generally surprised that so many Ukrainians, 63%, are willing to endure the war. But I consider this data to be not very indicative. I would like to see this survey in February or March of next year, after we have gone through this winter. But I also understand that many Ukrainians are hoping for a miracle. Not only in the rear but also at the front, hoping that Trump will come and stop this war. God willing, I am wrong, but I do not see real levers through which Trump can stop the war. He might pause it. But this would be a peace on terms that I do not know if these 63% would accept.

– Is society ready for a bad compromise within the ceasefire you mentioned?

– The question is not being posed yet. I know that a good half of [Ukrainians] want a ceasefire, a compromise involving Western countries. And obviously, by default, on terms favorable to Ukraine. But what are favorable terms? Favorable terms are only possible when there is enough strength on both Ukraine's and our allies' sides. And we lack strength. We are significantly lacking. Ukraine has been fighting for almost three years, allied assistance has not been enough, and now there is also the question of what will happen with Trump, as assistance may either decrease or increase. And every peace or ceasefire is a function of power: who has what power. Right now, I see no reason why Putin should agree to a ceasefire since he has power; he is currently in a strong position, so why should he stop his attack?

This is, of course, a guessing game, but if Trump were to exert sufficient pressure on China to cut off financial flows from China to Russia (for example, by imposing secondary sanctions on Chinese banks), that could have an impact. But would China agree to such things? That’s why I say there was uncertainty, and now there is chaos. But I understand one thing: everyone wants an end to this horror as soon as possible. Is this realistic? I have my doubts. We hope for a miracle, but a miracle needs to be well-prepared. I do not see that.

"Our war resembles the American Civil War"

– Has the war become a people's war for us? Yes or no? How do you feel?

– It was a people's war at the beginning. Now it is difficult to say who the people are. Ukrainians have been standing strong for almost three years, which speaks to the very strong resilience of society. Resilience, despite not-so-successful governance, exhaustion, a stretched front, and the way the TCUs operate. That is already a miracle. But I cannot say what kind of war this is now until it ends, as we do not know what period of the war we are currently in.

One of the wars most similar to ours is the war between the northern and southern states of America. Why? Because it was the first war of attrition. In this war of attrition, the North won. But already in the second year after great victories, there was a strong desire among many citizens of the northern states, particularly in New York, to end this war. There were calls to end it as quickly as possible, riots against mobilization, and African Americans were captured and lynched in the streets of New York, blamed as the cause of the war. This is the state of society. Was this war a people's war? Obviously, after it ended with a victory for the northern states, we can now say that this was a war that preserved the American nation.

– I ask about the categories of a people's war or not. Soldiers often feel resentment towards civilians. They argue that it is necessary to replace those who have been fighting for a long time. It feels like the majority of society does not hear these calls. It does not resonate with them.

– I understand what you are talking about, but this is the law of every war: what soldiers and officers want most is to return home. Period! That is a general rule. What soldiers and officers want least is to fight. I am not saying this applies to everyone, but to the majority. This is understandable because war is hell, and no one can live well in that hell.

But there is another feeling: we feel that justice has been violated in this country. For example, there are many ways to avoid mobilization. One could say that mobilization does not concern everyone. In other words, there are divisions emerging in society. These divisions are not commonly spoken about. In particular, there is a divide between what the government says and what society itself feels. From the very beginning, we fell into the trap of a heroic discourse: we will win and all the rest. This is quite understandable in the early stage of the war, but there is no next step, meaning we need to say that the war is actually long, and I do not promise anything but blood, sweat, and tears. And there is a gap between what the state says through telethons and what people actually see.

Most of the population has a clear notion: you are caught on the street, sent to a bad camp for 4-8 weeks, and then sent to the front, which is a one-way ticket. The only way to return is if you are wounded or killed. This discourse also exists. The first [state] and second discourses are not truthful. There should have been some middle discourse, a discourse of solidarity. But solidarity has been broken. Solidarity means that everyone should bear the burden of war according to their capabilities.

– Is this strange? In 2019, Ukrainians chose not to bear the burden of war, but rather to choose "not war".

– Well, back then we could choose.