Trust in Zelensky: a divine level. Antipovich discusses the real ratings of the president, Zaluzhny, and Arestovich in part II.

Although there are still many unexpected developments ahead on the negotiation track of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the possibility of holding elections this year has long been a topic of discussion among the public and politicians. Moreover, the idea of elections in Ukraine has recently been actively promoted by the U.S. administration and Donald Trump himself.

How eager are Ukrainians for these elections, and are they prepared for them? What accounts for the high level of support for Zaluzhny? Will there be chances for Arestovych, and what could critically undermine Zelensky's ratings? Read more about this in the second part of the interview with the head of the sociological group "Rating," Alexey Antipovich, for "Telegraph."

What sentiments do Ukrainians hold as they approach this historic milestone in the war? What ideological factors could reboot the motivation for mobilization, and will men of conscription age leave the country as soon as the borders open? Find out in the first part of the interview .

There is internal readiness for elections

– Let's talk about sociology and politics. Are there any measurements of electoral ratings at the moment?

– There is currently no discussion of electoral sociology at all. It sporadically appears in measurements of trust towards various figures in the Ukrainian government, political issues, and general political matters. For example, the attitude of Ukrainians towards holding elections during the war. This is where the entire electoral sociology comes to a halt.

– Why is that?

– Because the majority of Ukrainians believe that elections should not be held during wartime. About 50% feel this way regarding the Verkhovna Rada, which is the most suitable for re-elections. Support for local elections is even lower, and minimal support exists for presidential elections during the war. Up to one-third of Ukrainians support holding presidential elections during wartime. Understanding these sentiments, electoral sociology can certainly be measured, but what does it reveal? It shows whom people trust more and whom they trust less. In wartime, the president, the military, and volunteers as a class enjoy the highest levels of trust.

– Why do sociologists ask about trust in politicians during wartime? Why not directly ask: "If elections are held tomorrow, who will you vote for?" Or is that unethical?

– I think that by the third year of the war, it is indeed ethical because we see the overall mood regarding the state of affairs and trust in the government. There is distrust towards the parliament. Ukrainians have not trusted the parliament before the war, and they still do not trust it now. The Verkhovna Rada continues to be an institution that is essentially not perceived by Ukrainians. Measuring all these sentiments, we see that there is a general internal readiness among Ukrainians to participate in elections. However, the socially desirable response is: why spend money on elections during the war when it could be spent on the Armed Forces of Ukraine? But this is just one explanation. Another explanation is: what will change from these elections? We are in the midst of a war. First, we need to secure victory or bring the war to an end.

Nonetheless, the electoral aspect can already be measured, that is for sure. If it was probably inappropriate to ask such questions in the first year of the war and we did not study ratings, by 2025 this can already be measured. Why? To understand what we have today. And tomorrow, we could face missile strikes, blackouts, some peace agreement with the Russians, international aid could cease or increase, and all these factors will significantly influence support for the government and its opponents. And how do we measure ratings under these conditions?

The Zaluzhny phenomenon

– Explain the phenomenon of Zaluzhny's electoral popularity. Yes, he was the commander-in-chief, but it feels like we were just told that he has a high rating, and we all believed it, and that's how it turned out.

– Firstly, the level of trust in Zaluzhny is very high, and it remains so. Yes, it has decreased since Zaluzhny left office, but he remains a popular figure. This is not just something that was told to you; sociology confirms it. What are the reasons? Ukrainians often attribute characteristics to a politician, leader, or hetman (however you wish to call it) that they assign themselves. Viktor Andriyovych Yushchenko was once also seen as the embodiment of a good Ukrainian: criminals go to prison, these hands have stolen nothing, and so on. And Ukrainians completely believed in this. Ukrainians trust with their hearts...

– But Zaluzhny is silent!

– And that is why Ukrainians trust him. This person has not betrayed soldiers, has not sent them into operations where young men could perish, and many similar stories. When you read his interviews, they truly touch your heart; he is such a sincere, good Ukrainian. I don't think this image was artificially created by Zaluzhny himself or by political technologists. Everything artificial fades away. So, no matter how you look at it, Yulia Volodymyrivna was right for a time when she said, "Vote with your heart." This is essentially characteristic of our people.

– In one of the interviews regarding Zaluzhny, you mentioned that he embodies Ukrainians' hopes for a better future. And this is one of the main emotions of Ukrainians. What if some politician comes along and offers the same hope for the future, only in the form of coexistence with Russia rather than friendship? A sort of "Georgian scenario". What then? Would he overshadow Zaluzhny? Take Arestovych, for example.

– Let's return to the point that Russia is an enemy for 100% of Ukrainians. In order to propose a common future with the Russians, some change in the Russian state would be required. 60% of Ukrainians believe that restoring relations with the Russians is impossible in principle. Another 25% believe that restoring relations could be possible in 20-30 years.

So it’s not so much about the hope placed in Zaluzhny as it is about the vision for Ukraine. The internal vision is that as a citizen, you will have protection, security, material support, decent working conditions, and a good life. The external vision is that Ukraine is an exclusively European state. The majority of Ukrainians envision the country there and perceive joining the EU as a safeguard against future Russian encroachments. By the way, it offers no less protection than NATO, even though NATO is a military bloc, while the EU is not. Each Ukrainian will independently place their hopes on a politician who will provide that vision. Arestovych does not represent that vision. Zelensky does represent that vision, but he is the sitting president and bears all the responsibility. Is there corruption during the war? That is his responsibility. Are we losing territory? That is also his responsibility. Are there foolish decisions made by officials? Again, that falls on him. I’m not saying this is the actual responsibility of the president, but this is how it is perceived by Ukrainians.

The main complaint against Zelensky will be that in 2022 and 2023, he had the opportunity to simply cut off hands, hang, and shoot every embezzler. You didn’t do that. Everything else… I think, no. He has done well; he has held the country together and played an incredibly important role in its defense as a leader. Thus, he will be thanked for a long time and a lot, but the internal issues, mainly corruption, will be an anchor that holds back support for Zelensky. However, he is guaranteed immense support in the upcoming elections.

About Zelensky and Arestovych

– Let's establish this: Arestovych, as a person with a different vision, has no chance in the upcoming elections?

– The history of Arestovych has been very well researched by us. In May 2022, this person was trusted just as much as Zelensky. The thesis of two to three weeks was on everyone's lips. The absolute majority of Ukrainians were not so much believing as hoping that this war would end in two to three weeks. Arestovych played an extremely stabilizing role during that time. But then, when two to three weeks stopped being valid, trust in him began to decline. How can it be? Two to three weeks and nothing is ending. Two to three months and it still hasn’t ended. The psychological defense of Ukrainians ceased to function. We began to adapt for the long haul, and Arestovych started to "fall." And with the theses he later presented (some form of messianism), that was no longer perceived by Ukrainians, and the level of trust was simply minimal. Do many people watch and listen to him? Yes, but even if someone hates a particular blogger, they still listen to them. They need some information; they are curious